Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

In the Matter of the Adoption of Sally Ann Druce :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Benjamin Spence; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Druce, No. 7864 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1762

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

/

786.f

In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
l~ILED

SEP G- 'i~52
-· ---- ------·--·----.......
--~

~

. ·•·k.. ~\.II)' emc Court, Utah

INTHEMATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF

Case No. 7864

SALLY ANN DRUCE, A Minor.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

BENJAMIN SPENCE
Attorney for Appellant
1309 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------------------------

}

STATEMENT OF POINTS ·------·-------------·----·--------------------- 17
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------·------------------------ 18
Point I-The Court Erred in Denying the Objection of Appellant to the Introduction of Any Evidence on the Part
of Respondents for the Reason that the Petition of
Respondents Does Not State Facts Sufficient to Entitle
the Petitioners to Relief ---------------------------------------------------- 17
Point II-The Court Erred in Entering Its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment that the Appellant Was Not a Fit and Proper Person to Have the Care
and Custody of Her Minor Child, Sally Ann Druce____ 17
Point III-That the Court Erred in Entering Its Judgment
that the Appellant Voluntarily and Without Coercion,
Duress or Persuasion Gave Her Voluntary Consent to
Petitioners for the Adoption of Her Minor Child________ 17
Point IV-That the Court Erred in Entering Its Judgment
Denying the Right of the Appellant to Withdraw Her
Consent for Adoption of Her Minor Child by Resspondents -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 34

AUTHORITIES CITED
State ex rei. Platzer v. Beardsley et al., 183 N.W. 956__________ 20
Dwinnell et ux. v. Fallon et al., 248 N. W. 657 ---------------- 20
2 C.

J- S.

Page 386, Par. 4 ---------------------------------------------------- 20

7 Pa. Dist & Co., 139 Herbert v. Anderson---------------------------- 21
Nelms et ux. v. Birkland et ux., 279 Pac. 748 ------------------------ ·21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX (Continued)
Page
1 C. J. Page 13 78 -------------------------------------------------"-------------------- 21
In ReLease, 169 Pac. 816 -------------------------------------------------------'" 22
State ex rei. Towne et ux. v. Superior Court of Kitsap County
et al., 165 Pac. 2d 862 -------------------------------------------------~ 22
Williams et ux. v. Caparelli, 175 Pac. 2d 153 ------------------------ 23
State v. Beardsley, 183 N. W. 956 ---------------------------------------- 23
2 C.

J. S. Par 21, Adoption of children------------------------------------

23

In Re White's Adoption, 1 N. W. 2d 579 ---------------------------- 24
Fitts v. Carpenter, Tex. City App. 124 S. W. 2d 420 ____________ 24
130 ALR 1030, Annotations---------------------------------------------------- 25
French v. Catholic League, 144 N. E. 2d 113 ____________________ 25
Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 21 So. 2d 709 ---------------------------.--------- 25
Re McDonnell's Adoption, 176 Pac. 2d 778 ------------------------ 26
LaPriel Taylor et al v. George Q. Waddups et al., Case No.
7720, not reported, Utah· Supreme Court -------------------- 26
Stuber v. Stuber, Case No. 7764, Utah Supreme Court, not
reported ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 29
Cook v. Cook et al, 248 Pac. 83, Utah ------------------------------------ 3.0
LaPriel Taylor et al v. George Q. Waddups et al., Case No.
7720, not reported, Utah Supreme Court -------------------- 32
In Bildervack et al v. Clark et al, 189 Pac. 977 ------------------------ 33

STATUTE CITED
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Section 14-4-4 -------------------------- 19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

INTHEMATTER OF THE ADOPTION

I

OF

Case No. 7864

SALLY ANN DRUCE, A Minor.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
On October 23, 1951 Sheldon A. Jacobsen and Ruby H.
Jacobsen, his wife, through their attorneys, Young, Young and
Sorensen filed their pettiion in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, petitioning the court for the adoption of Sally Ann Druce, a minor
of the age of three years, which child was born issue of the
marriage of Charles R. Druce and Merlyn Druce, and was
born on the 20th day of April, 1948 (Tr. 3). That on the same
day said petition was filed in said court, the mother of said
minor child, Merlyn Druce, appeared in court and signed a
consent for the adoption of said child.

3
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That while said petition was still pending, the Appellant,
and mother of said child, Merlyn Druce filed her answer to
the petition of Respondents on the 9th day of February, 1952,
alleging therein that said petition for adoption fails to state
facts, or a claim upon which relief can be granted. Admitting
that said child is a minor or the age of three years and that
she is the child of Appellant, Merlyn Druce, and that said
child is in the custody of Respondents and has resided in their
home for eleven months, and. did further admit and deny other
allegations in said petition for adoption, which is revealed by
said answer of appellant to said petition.
That on March the 8th, 1952, Appellant served and .filed
an amended answer to petiion for adoption by the said respondents of the said child Sally Ann Druce in which she admits
that said petitioners are husband and wife and that they have
resided in Provo and their respective ages and are citizens
of the United States and that the said minor -child was born
on the 20th day of April, 1948 in Salt Lake County, Utah and
that said minod child has resided with respondents for several
months last past.
She further admits that she did at one time give her consent to the adoption of said minor child by respondents, but
under circumstances which she sets forth further in said amended answer and she further denies that it is for the best interest
of said minor child to be adopted by respondents.
In paragraph one of her affirmative defense to said petition she alleges that· said petition of respondents fails to state
facts, or a claim upon which the relief claimed for by respondents can be granted.

4
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In paragraph 2 of said affirmative defense she alleges the
birth of said minor child as the issue of the marriage of herself
and Charles A. Druce and in paragraph 3 of said affirmative
defense she alleges that shortly after the birth of said child
the father of said minor child deserted and abandoned the
Appellant and has remained away ever since and has done
nothing for the support of herself and said minor child and
is in the military service of the United States, and because of
her financial condition she was compelled to place said minor
child with her maternal grandparent with whom she was
residing and that she did assist her grandmother in caring for
said minor child, but due to some differences she had with
her grandmother she was compelled to leave the home of
her grandmother and did leave the child with said grandparent, and that Appellant did take said child later and place
same in a day nursery, and that said grandparent did, without
the consent of Appellant take said child from said day nursery
and place the same with respondents to care for said minor
child.
In paragraph 4 of said affirmative answer appellant
alleges that because of her financial condition and her emotional upsets and the constant persuasions of the attorney
for respendents to get her to consent to the adoption of said
minor child, and advising her that it was for the best interests
of said minor child, she did give her consent in writing to
the adoption of said minor child.
In paragraph 5 of said affirmative defense, she alleges
that since she did give her consent to the adoption of said
minor child, her financial condition has changed for the better
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and she was then in a position to properly provide for said
minor child and therein did revoke her consent to the adoption
of said minor child by said respondents and that she is a fit and
proper person to have the custody of said minor child and
so prays the court to permit her to revoke her consent for
the adoption of said minor child and have said child returned
to her.
Respondents filed their reply to said amended answer of
Appellant in which they deny that the consent for adoption
obtained from said Appellant was obtained by persuasion
or coercion on the part of respondents and that it is for the
best interests of said minor child to have respondents adopt
it and generally admit the allegations in said affirmative
defense set forth save and except that they deny that the said
Appellant is in a financial condition to properly care for said
child and that she has a right to rescind her consent for the
adoption of said minor child by respondents, or that she is
a fit and proper person to care for said minor child.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the matter was set for trial
before the court on the 24th day of March, 1952, and the
parties thereto being present with their respective counsel
and their witnesses and a trial was had thereon and on the 30th
day of April, 1952 the court rendered its decision and concluded that respondents had in all ways complied with the
statutory requirements having to do with the adoption of said
minor child and that they were fit and proper persons to adopt
said minor child.
That said Appellant did on the 23rd day of October, 1951
freely and voluntarily give her consent in open court for the
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adoption of her child by said respondents and that no undue
influence or coercion was used on Appellant to induce her
to give said consent for adoption.
That Appellant's moral behavior has not changed since
October 2}, 1951 and her financial condition has not improved
since that time.
That it is for the best interests of said child to have said
respondents adopt said minor child.
That the father of said minor child has now given his
consent for the adoption of said minor child by said petitioners.
That the court did make and enter its findings of fact
in conformity therewith, and entered its decree accordingly.
From said findings of fact and conclusions of law and
decree of the court the mother of said minor child, Merlyn
Druce, takes this appeal.
The evidence in this case respectfully shows that Merlyn
Druce, Appellant herein, has resided with her grandmother
most of her life, her mother having died when she was six
years old and she never knew her father (Tr. 28). That in
1947 she married one Charles Druce and that she lived with
him only three months when they separated. They went back
to live together intermittently until the child in question,
Sally Ann Druce, was born on April 20, 1948. That thereafter the said Charles A. Druce lived with Appellant for
about three weeks and then left her and has not lived with
her since (Tr. 29). Appellant then went back to live with
her grandmother and took the child with her. Her husband
7 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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has never contributed to the support of Appellant of their
child since its birth with the exception of buying the child a
dress on its first birthday and some little groceries (Tr. 52).
Appellant then went back to live with her grandmother
and took her child with her. The child remained with the
grandmother for amout two years, when said child was placed
with respondents at Provo, Utah, for them to care for her
( T r. 30) . The child was placed with respondents by the
grandmother because the grandmother felt she could no longer
care for the child and the respondents consented to take and
care for the child. The child was placed with respondents
without the knowledge or consent of the Appellant and she
did not know the child was with respondents until January,
1951 (Tr. 30-31).
During the time appellant and her child were living with
her grandmother she did what she could to repay her grandmother for her confinement expenses and the support of the
child, but due to her financial condition she was compelled
to impose upon her grandmother to take care of the child
(Tr. 30).
There was apparently no arrangements made or any
understanding had with the Appellant for the adoption of
this child at that time, nor at any time, until the appellant
was persuaded and coerced by the attorney for respondents
and the respondents themselves, to give her consent to the
adoption of this child. The child lived in the home of the
respondents for some eleven months and they decided they
wanted to adopt the child and then took the steps to persuade
the appellant to give her consent to this adoption.
8
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In January, 1951, Mr. Young, respondents' attorney, called
on Appellant and advised her that respondents wanted to
adopt the child and had to have her consent and that it was
for the child's benefit to have them adopt her. Appellant
then stated that she would not give her consent to adopt the
child (Tr. 31).
Within the next three weeks Mr. Young called on Appellant several times trying to persuade her to sign the consent
for the adoption of this child and in response to the following
questions she replied (Tr. 32-33):
Q. Was it in Salt Lake or Provo?

A. Yes, it was in Salt Lake.
Q. All right, what took place then?

A. Well, again he asked me if I would sign the adoption papers. Told me that it was selfish of me to want
to deprive Sally of the things I couldn't give her
because I didn't have the money or means.
Q. What did you say to him?

A. I wouldn't sign them then.
After this refusal, Mr. Young kept coming to see Appellant and trying to persuade her to sign her consent to this
adoption (Tr. 33-34-35).
Q. You didn't have a home for Sally at that time, did
you?

A. No, I didn't.
Q. Now, when did you see him again?

A. I believe I came down to Provo with him again.

Q. Did he come up to get you?
9
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A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose?
A. To bring me down here.
Q. What was your conversation with him then?

A. The same thing, why wouldn't I sign, because it
\vas better for Sally and better for me, and that
I had nothing to give her, nothing to offer her.
Q. Pursuant to that what did you do?

A. I still did not sign. I said I probably would because
I didn't have a place to take her, it was true, and
I said I would consent to-I would think it over.
Q. About how long after that when you came to
Provo and he took you back was it that you saw
him again at your home in Salt Lake, if you know?

A. About three months.
Q. What was said then?

A. Oh, I consented to sign the papers then, and we
came down to Provo, and I came in this very same
room I think, I believe, I don't know, and signed
the papers.
Q. And did you sign them?

A. Yes.
Q. Why did you necessarily sign them?

A. Because I didn't feel I could take care of Sally.
Mr. Young, respondents' attorney, worked on appellant
trying to get her to give her consent to this adoption over a
period of a year (Tr. 52).

Q. Now, about how many times did Mr. Young come
10
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to see you regarding the adoption of this child
and getting the consent?
A. About five times.
Q. Over a period of a year?

A. Over a period of a year.
Besides the efforts of Mr. Young, appellant's family
used their influence upon appellant trying to get her to give
her consent to this adoption, and she refused. Upon crossexamination appellant testified (Tr. 45):
Q. You didn't tell them you had been coerced into

consenting, did you?

A. No.
Q. You told them you thought it was for the best in·

terest of the child that be done, didn't you?
A. I told them I couldn't fight because I didn't have
the money to fight with, no place to take Sally.
Q. And at that time didn't you tell them that you had

no place to take the child and you weren't even
going to contest the adoption matter?
A. I told them I wasn't in any position to do anything.
(Tr. 48).
Q. What yid you tell them?

A. I remember that they came up and we were talking
outside in the car and they wanted to know what
I was going to do, just what I was going to do,
and I said I didn't know, I wasn't in any position
to say anything or do anything. (Tr. 48).
Again on redirect examination appellant testified as follows (Tr. 50):
11
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Q. Mrs. Druce, when you appeared in court to sign
this consent what remark was made by Mr. Young
after the consent was signed about obtaining this
consent?

A. Well, I remember that Mr. Young was awfully
glad to get it and he had been working some time
on it, and he said he had been working some time,
if you remember, Mr. Young; and I believe it is
the same Judge, and you said, "Well, I have been
a year or approximately a year on this, I should
get a thousand dollars for it."
Q. Now, did anybody else use any persuasions or influence upon you to sign this consent?

A. Why, of course, they were after me from January,
1951 until I signed the consent.
Appellant was persuaded and coerced by all of her relatives, her grandmother, Mr. Young and the respondents, to
permit the respondents to adopt this child. Although appellant
loved her child, she was not in a position financially to properly
care for the child at that time and because of her financial
position and her emotional upset by being continually harassed
to give her consent she did so, but the evidence clearly shows
that it was not willingly done (Tr. 51-52-53). The grandmother was tired of caring for the child and she was desirous
of being relieved of this burden and did all she could to get
the child adopted out. To confirm this fact Mrs. Jacobsen was
asked as follows (Tr. 83):

Q. And you didn't know when you took the child
whether you could adopt the child or not, did you?
A. No, we did not.
Q. You weren't even-promised you could?
12
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A. The grandmother promised us if Merly didn't come
back and help to raise her that she would do everything in her power to help us adopt her.
The appellant was recalled to the stand and testified as
follows (Tr. 124-125):
Q. Did you have a talk with Mrs. Jacobsen before you
signed this consent with relation to whether there
could be trouble or she was going to fight you if
you didn't sign this consent?

A. I was told by my grandmother that it would be
impossible for me to take Sally Ann out of the Jacob-·
sen home before this consent was ever signed. I
was told I couldn't take her without signing it because of my past actions.
Q. Now, you heard the testimony, Merlyn, about them
coming up to the place where you lived and talking
with you in the automobile?
A. Yes.

Q. What did they say then about creating some trouble
for you?

A. They said-well, this is just the exact words, "If
there is any trouble we will just have to put you
in jail, that's all," because of this bigamist position
I am supposed to be living in or was at that time
they supposed. And I stated I wasn't in any position
to make them any trouble really, but I told Mrs.
Gudmundson at the time that I did want Sally,
that I did want her, but I didn't see how I could
fight anyone with any money, or I didn't know
what to do. I just didn't know what to do, I said.
Q. But they did tell you you would go to jail if you
attempted to fight this case?

A. They said, "Well, you couldn't make too much
1?
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trouble, Merlyn, because we would just have to
put you in jail, that's all."
Respondents, through their respective witnesses, including
the grandmother of appellant and her sister have attempted
to show that appellant was not a fit and proper person to have
the custody of this child and in support of this proposition
testified that appellant was never attentive to her child and
did not come home to care for the child or visit with it
only seldomly and her conduct was such by way of drinking
beer and staying out late at nights and on one occasion was
supposed to have been caught in a compromising position with
a boy friend she was going with (Tr. 121). This was by
her half sister, but appellant denied this (Tr. 125-126). There is
little evidence in the whole record to show that appellant is an
unfit mother to have her child. She was in unfortunate circumstances and a victim of such, but there is no evidence produced
by respondents to show that she was an unfit person or unfit
to have her child.
At the time appellant signed the consent for the adoption
of her child, she met a young man by the name of Jack Farrer
who wanted to marry her, and she, acting under a misapprehension about her marriage to Charles Druce, went through
a marriage ceremony with the said Jack Farrer and lived with
him a short while, until it was brought to her attention that
she was still the wife of Charles Druce. Her own husband,
Charles Druce, and her grandmother likewise led her to believe she was not married to Charles Druce (Tr. 56-57-58).
Appellant testified that she was under age when she
married Charles Druce and her grandmother objected very
14
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much to it. That after they came home and separated the
grandmother would not let Charles Druce come to her home
to see the appellant or his baby (Tr. 56). She further testified
that she was under the impression she was not married to
Charles Druce as follows:
Q. Now, Mrs. Druce, after you married Mr. Druce and
you came back home, what took place between
you and your grandmother about this marriage?

A. Grandmother and I fought about the marriage
to begin with. . . etc.
Q. I am talking about, Mrs. Druce, with relation to
the validity of your marriage to him.

A. I was under the impression until we found out
that I wasn't married to him.
Q. What led you to that impression, what facts ?
A. The fact that he told me I wasn't. That is why I
never got any money out of him. And that it is just
all mixed up, he told me I wasn't married to him,
and between him and my folks I didn't know what
it was, where I stood.
Q. What did your grandmother do about your marriage?

A. Grandmother had me to an attorney at one time;
I don't know his name, I don't remember.
Q. Did she tell you you weren't married to Charlie?
A. Not actually come right out and tell me.
Q. Did she tell you she had procured an annullment?

A. Yes, she said she was going to have one.
Q. When you went through this marriage ceremony
with Mr. Farrer, were you under the impression
at that time you were not married to Charlie?

15
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A. I was under the impression that I wasn't.
Q. When did you find out to the contrary?
A. The date, it was the 15th of February, around the
15th of February.
Q. What was the occasion for your finding that out?
A. I wanted to withdraw my consent to this adoption.
The people dug into it and found out, and my
mother-in-law, Jack's mother phoned to Elko and
found out that the marriage was good.
Appellant further testified that since she found out her
marriage to Farrer was not good she did everything she could
to procure a divorce from her husband, Charles Druce, so
that should could properly marry Jack Farrer. That Charles
Druce was in the army and he would do nothing toward assisting her by letting her get a divorce. That she had tried to
contact him to get him to sign a waiver, but she could not
find him, nor would his people tell her where he was, and
they finally informed her that her husband was not interested
and he would not do anything about it. Druce later came home
at the time of this hearing and he still would not do anything
to let her have a divorce. He was in the army and she could
not sue him unless he signed a waiver. She further testified
that the said Jack Farrer wanted to properly marry her and
that he was earning sufficient to care for her and the baby and
provide a home for them (Tr. 57-58).
Pursuant to the foregoing the court took the matter under
advisement and later rendered its judgment, denying to the
appellant her right to withdraw her consent to the adoption.
That no undue influence or coercion was used upon appellant
16
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to obtain her consent, and she had freely and voluntarily
gave her consent to the adoption; that it is for the best interests of said child that she be adopted by the respondents
and accordingly entered its findings of fact and conclusions
of law and decree herein (Tr. 142-143.-144-145-146-147-148149-150).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OBJECTION
OF APPELLANT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY
EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS FOR
THE REASON THAT THE PETITION OF RESPONDENTS
DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE
THE PETITIONERS TO RELIEF.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CARE AND CUSTODY
OF HER MINOR CHILD, SALLY ANN DRUCE.

POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS
JUDGMENT THAT THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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AND WITHOUT COERCION, DURESS OR PERSUASION
GAVE HER VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PETITIONERS
FOR THE ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD.

POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS
JUDGMENT DENYING THE RIGHT OF THE APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HER CONSENT FOR ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD BY RESPONDENTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OBJECTION
OF APPELLANT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY
EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS FOR
THE REASON THAT THE PETITION OF RESPONDENTS
DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE
THE PETITIONERS TO RELIEF.
At the time of trial and before any evidence was introduced in said matter the appellant, by her counsel, objected
to the introduction of any evidence in said matter for the
reason that the petition of respondents did not state facts
sufficient to entitle the petitioners to relief, and upon the
further grounds that the appallant had the right to withdraw
her consent to said adoption· at any time before the adoption.
The court overruled this objection and proceeded to trial.
18
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Section i4-4-4 U.C.A. 1943, CONSENT TO ADOPTION.
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child
without the consent of its mother, if living, except that
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child
on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion;"
At the time of filing the petition for adoption and hearing
had thereon no consent was obtained from the father of this
child to this adoption and appellant had withdrawn her
consent and the court could not proceed to hear this adoption
without the petitioners complying with the foregoing provisions
of the Statute and the court should have sustained the objection of the appellant to any hearing on this petition, because it did not comply with the statute in alleging the
consent of the parents of said child, nor did it allege that
the father of said child had been judicially deprived of the
custody of said child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion.
The only allegation therein contained was to the effect that
the father, shortly after the marriage of appellant and the
father of said child, deserted and abandoned it, and that
petitioners had made diligent search to find him. Nor does
the reply of petitioners therein filed cure any defects of the
petition in setting forth the necessary allegations as required
by the statute.
Aside from the foregoing the objections were further
contended for upon the principle and the law, that a parent
of a minor child could withdraw her consent to the adoption,
although previously given, at any time before the adoption
of said child, and that the consent, even though it was obtained
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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voluntarily and without undue influence, coercion or persuasion, could be withdrawn by the parent, and that the appellant had ·;withdrawn her consent to said adoption and notified
the petitioners of this fact before any hearing had hereon
or before any proceedings for adoption was had in this matter
and expressly withdrew her consent for adoption in her
amended answer to said petition (Tr. 13).

In support of the foregoing contention the following
authorities are cited:
183 N. W. 956. Minn.
"Appellants could not adopt the child without obtaining respondent's consent. Section 7153, G. S. 1917
Supp. Her refusal to consent still left the child in appellant's custody. They base their right to retain the
custody of her agreement with them and on the claim
that it is for the best interest of the child that it be
left with them.
"The written agreement created no binding obligations respecting the custody of the child. State v. Anderson, 198 N. W. 681; State v. Armstrong, 169 N.W.
249; State v. Pelowski, 177 N.W. 627.
248 N. W. 657, Minn.
"Even if it could be assumed that in the distress of
her unmarried motherhood she contemplated abandonment, it was but a fleeting impulse. If at one time there
was temporary consent by her, it was withdrawn before commencement of this proceeding. Such a consent
once given, may be withdrawn at any time before adoption. State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 183 N.W. 956.
2 C. ]. S. Page 386, Par. 4.
"Consent may be withdrawn at any time before adop20
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tion, even though given in writing, and accompanied
by transfer of the custody of the child, and even though
the natural parent had abandoned the child; and an
adoption based upon a consent that has been withdrawn is void."
7 Pa. Dist. & Co. 139, Herbert v. Anderson .

"Until a legal adoption has been affected, a consent
may be revoked, even though the child has been placed
wtih a welfare agency with a view to its adoption by
others.''
Nelms et ux, v. Birkland et ux., 279 Pac. 748. Washington.
"Without a statute or without compliance with a
statute, there is no such thing in our law as the adoption of an heir. Adoption was not known to the common law, and is a matter purely statutory. Courts
have passed upon this question frequently, and have
adhered with much strictness to this rule. (Citing
authorities.
"The mother in this case expressly gave a written
consent, and the claimed right of adoption was .based
on that. From the facts stated and from others that
appear in the record, it is clear that , prior to the time
that the petition for adoption was first filed, the written consent given by the mother had been revoked,
and this she had a right to do prior to the time that a
legal adoption was made, assuming, without so deciding, that the written consent satisfied the requirement
of the statute. In 1 C. J. P. 1378, it is said:
"A natural parent, by entering into a contract for
the adoption of his child by another, waives his right
to the custody and control of the child; but, subject
to his liability to be sued for breach of his contract,
he may revoke his gift and resume custody of his child
at any time before a legal adoption has been made."
21
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"The written consent having been revoked, it is
plain that the necessary statutory requirement to enable
the court to enter a legal order of adoption has not
been complied with. The extinguishment of the rights
of the natural parents to the custody and control of
their child is not a matter of discretion on the part
of the court. Before the natural parents' right to the
custody and control of their child can be extinguished,
the statutory requirements must be complied with. If
the statutory requirements are complied with then
it becomes a matter of discretion as to the propriety
of the proposed adoption, and the question of the moral,
ilntellectual, and material welfare of the child becomes
a matter for the court to take into consideration. In
Re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 417, 169 Pac. 816, 817, it is
said:
"The legal parentage of a child is not and cannot
be lawfully changed under our laws, as a matter of
the court's discretion, in so far as the consent of the
minor's parents is concerned. Until the consent of both
living parents is given in the manner provided by
our statute above quoted, or it is clearly shown that
such consent is unnecessary, because of the existence
of conditions specified in the statute, the court has no
discretion to act in the matter at all."
"The written consent in the present case having been
revoked prior to the time that any legal action took
place, and there being no other conditions which would
authorize the court to extinguish the rights of the
natural parents to the custody and control of their
child, there is no legal basis under the statute to sustain the adoption order."
State ex rel. Towne et ux. vs. Superior Court of Kitsap
County et al. 165 Pac. 2d. 862. Washington.
"On November 10, 1944, Irene Vinsant gave her
22
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written consent to Mack S. Kaliszewski and his wife,
Sylvia M. Kaliszewski, for the adoption of the child.
On January 26, 1945, while adoption proceedings instituted by the Kaliszewskis w.ere pending, she revoked
her consent given on November 10, 1944. That she
had the legal right and power to revoke the consent
she had given is not questioned."
Williams et

u..~,

v. Capparelli, 175 Pac. 2d 153. Oregon.

"It is the general rule that a natural parent who
has consented to the adoption of a child in compliance
with a statute which makes such consent a prerequisite
to adoption may effectively withdraw or revoke his
consent at any time before the court has made a decree
of adoption. 44 No. E 2nd 113; 124 S. W. 2d 420;
1 N. W. 2d 579; 279 N. Y. S. 427; 33 N. Y. S. 2d
793; 60 N. Y. S. 2d 421; 279 Pac. 748. A few holding
to the contrary appear to have been based upon the
provisions of the particular statutes under consideration."
"Nevertheless, it would seem that courts should not
interfere with the natural relationship of parent and
child upon the sole ground that the proposed adoptive
parents are able to give the child superior advantages
over those within the means or social status of the
natural parents. State v. Beardsley, 183 N. W. 956."
"A text writer has suggested that some of the more
recent decisions have shown a tendency on the part of
the courts to deny the right of a parent to withdraw
consent to adoption before final decree, if the consent
was given voluntarily with a full understanding of
every fact necessary thereto. 2 C. J. S. Par. 21 Adoption
of children. It will be seen however from a study of the
cases cited in support of the text, (and relied upon by
petitioners herein) that the rule under which a parent
is permitted to withdraw consent before final decree,
23
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has not been departed from, but rather that in the
case scited matters of equitable estoppel were invoked
asainst the parent."
In Re White's adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. 2d
579. ( 1940).
"Appellants contend that Marcena White, the natural mother, could not withdraw her consent at the time
it was attempted without showing fraud and duress
in the procurement thereof. While this question has
not been squarebly before us, it has been raised in
various proceedings in other jurisdictions. In Minnesota, it has been held that the mother's consent may
be revoked at any time before the child is legally
adopted, State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn.
435; 183 N. W. 956. In Washington it is held that
adoption is a contract between the parties but that a
natural parent may revoke his consent at any time before a legal adoption has been made, subject to his
liability to be sued for breach of contract, and that
when the written consent is once revoked, the necessary consent being absent, such an order cannot be
made. In re Nelms, 153· Wash. 242, 279 P. 746. See
also, Fitts v. Carpenter, Tex. City App. 124 S. W.
2d 420. In the case at bar, the probate judge stated no
reason for setting aside the original order, and the
record before us contains none of the testimony taken
either in the probate court or in the circuit court on
the appeal. Without a record disclosing what reasons
impelled the mother to withdraw her consent, we have
no occasion to pass upon the question whether such
reasons were sufficient, if indeed any stated reason
is necessary beyond the mere fact she had changed her
mind. It is our opinion that under the circumstances
of this case, no vested rights have intervened, the natural
mother had the right to withdraw her consent to the
24
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adoption during the ninety days while the probate
court still had control over the matter by rehearing."
In the annotation to the foregoing case (130 ALR 1030)
the majority and minority rules as to withdrawal of consent by
the natural parent is thus stated ( 1038-39):
"The rule in a majority of the jurisdictions wherein
the question has arisen is that a natural parent's consent to the proposed adoption of a child, duly given
in compliance with a statute requiring such consent as
a prerequisite to an adoption may be effectively withdrawn or revoked by the natural parent before the
adoption has been finally approved and decreed by
the court, Re White (Mich.) (Reported herewith)
anto, 1034; Re Nelms (1929) 153 Wash. 242, 279
Pac. 740. And see State ex rel Platzer v. Beardsley
(1921) 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956; Re Anderson
( 1933) 189 Minn. 85, 248 N. W. 657; Fitts v. Carpenter (1939) Tex. Civ. App. 124 S. W. 2d 420.
French v. Catholic League, 60 Ohio 442, 144 N.E. 2d 113.

"Why should such an unfortunate mother not be
permitted to revoke her prior consent for relinquishment when she has not been advised of its acceptance
and it has not yet been acted upon? . . . She might
have been destitute and shortly thereafter acquired an
inheritence and an ability to care for her offspring.
Must she adopt her own child? Surely, she being a
suitable person, it would have been a cruel thing for
a society devoted to the welfare of children to say
you cannot reclaim your given word and have back
your child."
Wright v. Fitzgibbons, reported in 21 So. 2d 709. Mississippi.
25
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The facts show that the mother of an infant child gave
her consent to its adoption and petitioner, Mrs. Fitzgibbons,
filed her petition to adopt the child based on said consent of
the mother. The mother then appeared, objected and withdrew her consent before a decree was entered. The court, in
allowing the withdrawal said:
"This appellant having appeared and objected to
the adoption of her child, her consent thereto theretofore given for its adoption, became ineffectual."
The court found in that case that the mother had abandoned the child and proceedings for decree of adoption were
filed in 1945 after a consent had been given in 1938 and the
mother evidenced little or no interest in the child during
~even years.
Re McDonnell's Adoption 176 Pac. 2d 778. California.
"We think it must be concluded from the adoption
statutes of this state that the natural parents have the
right to withdraw a consent to adoption at any time
before the rendition of the decree of adoption.''
In a recent decision of our own Supreme Court in the
case of LaPriel Taylor, mother of Howard Wayne, Oinda
Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen Taynor, Minors, vs. George Q.
Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, his wife, decided March 3·,
1952, but not reported, the court held that such a consent could
be revoked by the natural parents of a child placed for adoption. I quote the words of Justice Wade in his concurring
opinion:
"I concur on the ground that plaintiff had effectively
revoked her consent to the adoption of these children
26
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before it was consummated, and there was no showing
that she had deserted them.''
In the same opinion I quote the words of Justice Henriod:
" ... and second that prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, the natural mother effectively revoked any consent to adoption that she may have given,
a right generally conceded under the authorities, when
applied to the facts of this case."
There are numerous other authorities of different states
which hold to this proposition and it would only add a repetition of these holdings which would serve no further purpose
other than to confirm the above cases and their holdings as cited.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CARE AND CUSTODY
OF HER MINOR CHILD, SALLY ANN DRUCE.
The proceedings had in this case were certainly not a
proceeding to determine, by the court, whether the mother
of this child, appellant herein was a fit and proper person to
have the custody of her child, nevertheless the court apparently
proceeding on that theory and while the court was silent in
its decree on this matter, the court elaborated on the conduct
of the appellant and in its conclusions of law set forth in paragraph 3 thereof (Tr. 147):
27
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"That Merlyn Druce's moral behavior has not changed since October 23, 1951, and her financial condition
has not improved since that time."
That in paragraph 7 of said findings of fact the court elaborated upon her supposedly misconduct and from such findings
I am sure, this had a great influence upon the court in rendering
the decision in denying the appellant the right to revoke her
consent to adopt (Tr. 145).
I respectfully ask the court to review the transcript and
the testimony regarding her supposedly misconduct, as to
whether, from such evidence she could be adjudged an unfit
mother to have this child. The most that was said was that
she married without her grandmother's consent and while
she was a minor and that she could not get along with her
grandmother. She was accused of going out and keeping company with another man while she was still married to Charles
Druce and keeping late hours and sometimes getting intoxicated and that she married another man before she could get
a divorce from Charles Druce. The appellant admitted these
things, but denied positively that she ever had any improper
relations with these men, other than the fact that, she under
a mistaken idea, and believing that she was not married to
Charles Druce, did go through a marriage ceremony with one
Jack Farrer, but upon discovery of this mistake, there is no
proof that she continued to live with this man she supposedly
married, and the findings of fact, set forth this fact that
she was still continuing to live with this man (Tr-146),
which the evidence does not support. She loves this man and
wants to properly marry him, and he wants to properly marry
her, but cannot do this until she can procure a divorce from
28
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Charles Druce, who takes advantage of the fact that he is
in the army and refuses to do anything to permit her to get
a divorce from him, although proceedings are now pending
for this purpose. The said Jack Farrer is able and willing
to care for her and her child and provide a proper home
for them.
Appellant is a victim of unfortunate circumstances. Her
mother died when she was 6 years old and she never knew
her father. She was raised by her grandmother, under apparently some hardships and unfortunate circumstances.
She married while she was 17 years of age (Tr-68). Her
husband lived with her off and on until the child was born
and three weeks thereafter deserted her and has never lived
with her or done anything for her or the child since that time.
She had to make her own way. She continually quarrelled with
her grandmother, and her life with her grandmother was
unbearable to her and she went her own way. She left the
child with her grandmother because she had no place to take
it. The grandmother got tired of taking care of the child and
placed the child with the respondents and promised them she
would do everything she could to see that they adopted the
child (Tr-83).
I respectfully submit, that from the evidence as to the
conduct of appellant, or misconduct, if it can be construed
or determined that appellant is or was an unfit person to have
the custody of her child.
In the case of Stuber v. Stuber, Case No. 7764, decided
by this court, but not yet reported as of May 19, 1952, the
court said:
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"It was agreed by both counsel at the oral argument
in this court that since the trial respondent had entered
into an apparently advantageous marriage to another
man. The fact that she lived with a man whom she expected to marry, although censurable, does not in itself
make her an unfit and improper person to have the
custody of her child. Citing Walton v. Coffman, 169
P. 2nd 97.
Again in Cook v. Cook et al, 248 P. 83 at page 108. Utah.
"Then too, the unfitness which deprives a parent of
the right to the custody of a child must be positive,
and not merely comparative, or merely speculative.
And too ,as heretofore observed, the referee with respect to this matter had before him the witnesses and
heard their testimony and found that there was no
evidence or even a suspiicon of improper relations between the defendant and Welch. This a finding
that the defendant is unfit to have the custody of the
child is not, on the record demanded or justified."
We think there is nothing in the evidence in this matter
to justify the lower court in finding that the appellant was not
a fit and proper person to have the custody of this child.

POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 1TS
JUDGJ\1ENT THAT THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY
AND WITHOUT COERCION, DURESS OR PERSUASION
GAVE HER VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PETITIONERS
FOR THE ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD.
In the first place, appellant's child was placed with respondents by her grandmother, without the consent or knowl30
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edge of appellant (Tr. 31). She did not learn of this until
January of 1951 (Tr. 31). The child was taken by the grandmother from a nursery home where appellant had taken her
and placed with the respondents (Tr. 54). Appellant was trying to support the child to the best of her ability.
When the respondents decided that they wanted to adopt
this child, what did they do? They secured their attorney, Mr.
Young, to contact the appellant to get her consent. Her testimony as outlined in her direct and cross examination and
contained in (Tr. 26-27-28-31-32-33-34-35-43-44-45-50-51-52,
etc.), shows that Mr. Young, the respondents and her family
all worked on appellant to get her to consent to this adoption.
She repeatedly refused to do so, until they finally persuaded
her to go before the court and sign a consent. She testified that
they had worked on her for almost a year by repeatedly contacting her at her work and otherwise, telling her that it was
for the best interests of the child and that it was selfish of
her to deprive the child of the comforts and things the mother
could not give her child (Tr. 33). She further testified that
the Jacobsens told her they would fight her if she tried to take
the child out of their home (Tr. 124). She was further told
that she could not take the child out of the home of respondents
because of her past actions (Tr. 124). She further testified
that the respondents even threatened to have her put in jail
because of her conduct in marrying another man before she
secured her divorce from Charles Druce.
After they finally persuaded appellant to go into court
and sign the consent for adoption, appellant testified as follows (T. 50):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. Mrs. Druce, when you appeared in court to sign
this consent what remark was made by Mr. Young
after the consent was signed about obtaining the
consent?
A. Well, I remember that Mr. Young was awfully glad
to get it and he had been working some time on it,
and he said he had been working some time, if
you remember, Mr. Young; and I believe it is the
same judge, and you said, "Well, I have been a year
or approximately a year on this, I should get a
thousand dollars for it."
Mr. Young: I still think I would like to have that much.
I respectfully asked the court if the consent of the appellant was obtained willingly and without coercion, persuasion, undue influence and even resorting to threats. The
record speaks for itself. The appellant had no money or a
proper place to take the child. She was torn between two fires.
Love for her child and its care and custody, and persuasions,
coercions, undue influence and threats to deprive her of it.
What could she do or where could she turn, hence the signing
of the consent.
Our own Supreme court said in the case of LaPriel Taylor
et al. v. George Q. Waddoups, supra. Wolfe Chief Justice:
·'The purpose of this requirement is that the court,
representing the public, can see that the parents when
they consent to the adoption of their children are
informed and fully understand the effect of the act
which they are performing. The court should endeavor
to protect the parents from fraud, misrepresentation or
undue influence in the obtaining of their consent. Oft
times, consents of adoption are signed by parents while
under great emotional strain, and, as in this case, they
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may be signed while the parent is suffering from discouragement and despair. To conduct the welfare
of all concerned, this safeguard is established as an
assurance that the parents have duly considered the
consequences of their act."
In Bildervack et al v. Clark et al., 189 Pac. 977, Kansas,
the court said:
"The natural parent must freely and voluntarily
consent to the adoption. This consent includes consent
to all the legal consequences of adoption."
If for no other reasons than the manner in which this
consent was obtained, the judgment of the lower could should
be reversed and the appellant regain the custody of her child.

Again the hearing on this matter was had, respondents
obtained the written consent of Charles Druce, the father of
this child, which consent was filed for record in the court on
the 25th day of April, 1952. How this consent was obtained
the record is silent. We conclude from the past actions of said
Charles Druce in not coming to the assistance of the appellant, supporting her or her child and doing nothing towards
strtightening out their matters by way. of permitting her to
obtain a divorce from him by reason of being in the army, that
his motive in signing this consent was ulterior.

POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS
JUDGMENT DENYING THE RIGHT OF THE APPEL-
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LANT TO WITHDRAW HER CONSENT FOR ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD BY RESPONDENTS.
We think we have said enough in the foregoing brief
under points I, II and III to cover Point IV. We respectfully
refer the court to the argument and the authorities heretofore
outlined under Point I hereinbefore set forth, which shows
that the weight of authority in most jurisdictions permit a
natural parent to withdraw her consent to adoption and have
her child restored to her and we could add nothing hereto
that would not be repetitious, other than citing additional
authorities to the same effect.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the appellant is entitled to
a reversal of the lower court's decision in this matter and that
appellant be permitted to withdraw her consent and regain
custody of her child.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE
Attorney for Appellant
1309 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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